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Chapter Five:
Christianity in Sri Lanka
"When churches fail to provoke reflection and questioning, crucial issues troubling the society, such as the Tamil Tiger (LTTE) inspired ethnic cleansing and the state sponsored extra-judicial killings and disappearances, can be conveniently ignored… [Christian] spirituality stemming from modernity has, because of its blindness to realities on the ground, shown itself to be incapable of responding adequately to the enormity and horror of the events in Sri Lanka." –Charles R. A. Hoole. [1]
Christianity has a nationwide presence in Sri Lanka. Although it represents only 7.6% of the population, Christian churches are established throughout the island with membership in both Sinhala and Tamil communities. [2] With such a significant presence in both ethnic groups, Christianity is uniquely positioned to act as a mediator, engage in reconciliation and amity work, and act as a significant voice for peace in the national dialog. Yet the churches have largely failed to live up to this potential: while some individual Christians have made significant contributions to the peace process, the churches as a whole have not played such a role.
Fr. Oswald Firth, OMI, suggests that Christians are generally content to avoid politics as long as their own communities are not in danger. [3] This is due in part to the position of Christianity as a minority religion and potential target of the Buddhist nationalists. But some argue that the churches have by nature adopted a conservative, passive role. By maintaining relationships and attitudes that developed under colonial domination, the churches have acted to support the status quo, and have failed to develop a prophetic witness among their followers.
Christianity in a Buddhist Country: A Brief History
Christianity arrived in Sri Lanka with the first colonial power, the Portuguese, in 1505. Both the Portuguese and Dutch reigns engaged in violence against the Sri Lankan people on the basis of religion, with the Portuguese in particular noted for destroying the ancient Buddhist temples. Over a period of three centuries, missionaries converted thousands of Sri Lankans to Catholicism, especially in the Southwest of the country, and Portuguese surnames such as Perera, Fernando, and De Silva became common. [4]
Under early British administration, evangelization was less of an issue: the 1815 Kandyan Convention, the treaty recognizing the British role in Sri Lanka, declared Buddhism "inviolate" and pledged to protect it from persecution. The first British colonial agent in Kandy, John D’Orly, told a gathering of monks, "We have not come to this country to destroy the religion of Boodoo [sic]… but to protect and promote it." [5] This pacified the Buddhist monks who, believing that their interests were better represented by the British colonials than by the Tamil monarch, turned against the Kandyan king to side with the British (see Chapter One).
Unfortunately, later British administrators and politicians forced a change in colonial policies. Linking Christianity with commercial success, they allied themselves with Christian evangelists of the day, blaming Buddhism for making the Sinhalese, as one American clergyman put it, "lazy betel-chewing irresponsible children." [6] Following an 1818 rebellion led by a Buddhist monk, British policy disavowed Buddhism’s official relationship with the colonial administration, opening the way for discrimination and further evangelization.
The British began to promote Christianity in Sri Lanka by elevating Christian converts into the ruling class, by giving preferential advantages to Christian businessmen, and by excluding non-Christians from schools. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Sinhalese and Tamil ruling classes were entirely Christianized, and one Colombo bishop wrote, "There are good grounds for believing that Buddhism will at no very distant period disappear from this island." [7] For a culture that saw itself as the legitimate inheritor of Buddhist teaching, this was a radical—and overly optimistic—prediction. Buddhism responded with its own evangelical campaign, the Buddhist revival of the mid-nineteenth century. Buddhist monks, who had formerly seen Christian missionaries as colleagues working together to promote moral society, adopted instead a competitive attitude that would ultimately link Buddhism with Sinhalese ethnic identity in the twentieth century. By the late nineteenth century, Buddhist-Christian tensions rose to the point of violence and anti-Christian riots broke out. [8]
As democracy was introduced in the early twentieth century, new laws increasingly protected Buddhists from discrimination. After independence, Buddhism regained its government protection under the Sri Lankan constitution. In this post-independence environment, Christianity was politically associated with the ruling Colombo elite and its pro-Western alliances. During the 1950s, political cartoons portrayed one politician, who in fact supported a pluralist secular state, as a missionary Christian intending to destroy Buddhism. Meanwhile, the Buddhist nationalist S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was characterized in 1956 as the upholder of Buddhist rights campaigning against "the shadowy conspiracy called Catholic Action." [9]
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism motivated Buddhists to join its cause by emphasizing the link between pro-Western views and Christianity. One Buddhist committee sought to ban all Christian activities. Other Buddhists, fearing that parochial schools were being used to convert children to Christianity, tried to convince Catholic schools to provide instruction in Buddhism to Buddhist children. The Catholics refused, and Buddhists began a movement to nationalize Christian schools to prevent Sri Lanka from becoming "an eastern outpost of the Vatican." [10]
One result of this anti-Christian sentiment was a decline in the numbers of Christians in Sri Lanka by nearly 25%, from 9.9% of the population in 1911 to 7.6% in 1981. Although the government does not distinguish between Catholics and Protestants, one evangelical writer claims that Protestants represent just 0.7% of the population, which suggests that most Christians in Sri Lanka are Catholic. Yet both Catholic and Protestant Christians retain disproportionate political and economic influence among both Sinhalese and Tamils. [11]
People I interviewed suggested a two-fold reason for this influential presence: first, Christianity remains associated with the ruling class elite, and second, Christians have learned to keep a low profile, largely avoiding involvement in controversial political issues. For these same two reasons, Christianity has not been motivated to take a significant position on the civil war.
Nationwide Presence, Hands Off Policy
Much of the earlier tension between Buddhists and Christians took place at the national level, as nationalist politicians took aim at nationwide Christian structures such as Catholic Action and Christian-run schools. At the local level, however, many Christian families had come from the lower classes, with Christianity providing a vehicle to break out of their low-caste status under the Portuguese, or to gain educational and economic advantages under the British. They had no desire to challenge the existing social order, ruled by a Christian elite in a majority Buddhist country. Indeed, the Catholic Church in particular had traditionally been associated with right-wing politics and the interests of the privileged, English-speaking ruling class. [12] Yet while this elite might provide little support for the interests of the lower-class Christians, clearly such a regime was friendlier to Christians than Buddhist nationalism, the most likely alternative.
Following Vatican 2 there were efforts among some Catholics to involve the Church in social justice issues. However, with Buddhist militants calling Catholic Action "an exclusivist mutual benefit organization" on the one hand, and condemning Catholic "property interests and business activities" on the other, it is easy to understand why, in a climate of rising Buddhist nationalism, Catholics in particular generally kept out of politics. The Church remained for the most part a church of institution rather than of action. [13] Protestant sects, being smaller in number and less unified, were more willing to cooperate with Sinhalese Buddhist goals, particularly with respect to education, and received some measure of conciliation and acceptance by Buddhists through the 1970s. [14]
On the whole, in this climate of suspicion, both Catholics and Protestants kept a low political profile. Even when their interests were directly at stake, they involved themselves subtly, very much aware that they were potential targets for Buddhist nationalism. As Wilson noted in 1974, "The fact that they are readily identifiable minority groups make them function more cautiously than the Buddhists." [15]
This tendency to avoid possible conflict became characteristic of the Christian community. Dissanayaka, writing in 1998, contrasted Sinhalese Buddhist relations with Christians against relations with other minority groups, observing, " [T]here is no intransigence between Buddhists and Christians…" [16] This is perhaps an overstatement. There is less conflict between Buddhists and Christians than with, for example, the Tamils—and less Buddhist-Christian conflict than there has been in the past. Nevertheless, Buddhist-Christian conflicts have again arisen in Sri Lanka. These conflicts result from two trends, both begun in the 1980s: first, the rise of an evangelical movement, and second, the increasing involvement of Christian clergy in human rights work.
The evangelical revival began as Sri Lankan evangelicals, trained primarily at Fuller Theological Seminary, returned to their home country. Ajith Fernando lists several reasons for the success of these evangelical efforts, not least of which is the uncertainty created by the civil war. The result, however, has been concern among Buddhists over disruption of traditional community structures and, in some cases, unethical conversion. [17] Opposition has occasionally turned violent. Fernando cites "the torching of as many as 21 churches over the past few years," while Christianity Today claims "a 230% increase in anti-Christian incidents" during 1997. [18] Many of the Buddhists who "converted" to Christianity have reverted to Buddhism in the face of criticism from their community. But it is clear that evangelization, regardless of its effectiveness in gaining converts, continues to generate increased friction between Buddhists and Christians.
Meanwhile, mainstream Christian leaders have become increasingly concerned with human rights. General Secretary of the National Council of Christian Churches Reinzie Pereira, Methodist President Duleep Fernando, and Anglican Bishop Kenneth Fernando are all involved with human rights issues. [19] Yet several of the most outspoken leaders have been criticized for failing to remain impartial in the conflict. Kenneth Fernando, for example, was instrumental in implementing peace talks between the Chandrika government and the LTTE in 1994, but then compromised his impartial role by accepting a position with the government negotiating team. As one Colombo pastor put it, "He ceased being a mediator and became a government negotiator. That’s not good for his role nor for the Christian minority in general." [20] On the other hand, Rajan Hoole criticizes the Catholic Church, and Bishop Deogupillai in particular, for being outspoken against human rights violations by the Sri Lankan military, but ignoring such violations by the LTTE. Similarly, UTHR(J) reports suggest that some high-profile Christian clergy have uncritically accepted the LTTE party line about several events, seemingly allowing themselves to become an outlet for LTTE propaganda. [21] It is perhaps natural for clergy of a particular ethnicity to favor the party that represents that ethnicity. However, siding with either of the parties to the conflict reduces the possibility of being effective mediators.
For the most part, however, Christians have been bystanders to the conflict. Whether from fear of Buddhist backlash, or from genuine lack of interest in political affairs, there has been no mass movement among church memberships to oppose the war. Fr. Firth says, "We Christians play a safe game. If we have our church and our little Montessori school, we are happy. We don’t like to get involved in peace and justice issues." [22] He also argues that church leaders, by failing to take a position against the war, have failed to motivate their congregations to do likewise. Even the Vatican, he says, refuses to take such a position.
The reasons for this failure to commit to peace are unclear. There may be some concern that opposing the war would portray insensitivity to the interests of one ethnic group or the other, thereby alienating church members. Or there may be concerns that the LTTE, in the absence of any other significant Tamil voice, really does represent the interests of the Tamil people. Firth seems to suggest that Sri Lanka, with its small number of Christians, is just not a big enough for the Vatican to take an interest in. If this is true, if Church leaders consider Sri Lanka only in terms of its Christian population, this highlights another aspect of Christianity’s failure to play a positive role in the conflict: its inability to engage Asian religions as equals.
The Need for an Asian Christianity
Felix Wilfred argues that Christianity’s political neutrality in South Asia reflects a set of patterns adopted during the colonial period, with the Catholic Church in particular unable to respond to peace and justice issues because of the role it has adopted in society. On the one hand, it differentiated itself from other religions, leaving itself isolated with no basis for meaningful dialog. On the other hand, it suffers from a historical emphasis on institutionalization: "The dominant image of the church… is that of a powerful organization with a large network of structures, institutions, and services." [23]
Wilfred argues that attention to peace and justice is one of the first things expected of the church, not an afterthought:
Issues relating to bread, equality and self-determination are not alien to the gospel and Jesus’ vision of the kingdom, but rather belong to their substance. The church must dialog with the situation and the various socio-historical forces shaping it. And a genuine dialog is only possible when the church inserts itself, roots itself, into the lives of the people struggling for liberation. [24]
The Church, he writes, has "clung to its traditional activities and services like educational, medical, development, and relief works. Far from playing a role of inspiration, involvement of Christians in grassroots movements is frowned upon, if not opposed, by a large number of church leaders." [25]
Charles Hoole, examining the possible relationships between Christians and the state, argues that Christianity has largely adopted a "quietistic" relationship with the state, accepting that the existing political situation cannot and should not be transformed. This approach comes from the fusion of colonial Christianity with indigenous bakti marga, which "puts personal devotion above all else." [26] More recently, the evangelical churches have introduced a more deterministic view of the state that emphasizes one’s personal salvation from a world that is beyond one’s power to change. Neither of these, he argues, can adequately respond to the events of recent history. [27]
What has failed to develop, according to Hoole, is a prophetic, apocalyptic witness that would challenge the status quo while still being subject to political authority. While some individual church leaders have spoken out against the widespread violence of the ethnic conflict, these declarations have been inadequate because the power of the church membership has not been behind them. [28]
There is a clear recognition by Christian thinkers that the church has a responsibility to confront misused power. [29] Some observers suggest that such a role has failed to develop due to a lack of democratic structures in the churches, that membership participation is essential to such a witness. Fr. Tissa Balasuriya, however, suggests that Christianity in Sri Lanka is even more deeply handicapped by its inability to dialog with other religions as equals. As long as Christianity holds a worldview promoting domination by Christians, it cannot adopt the role of prophetic witness in a pluralistic society. [30]
Balasuriya calls for a reexamination of Christian theology in light of its interaction with other faiths. Specifically he claims that the doctrines of original sin and the necessity of Christian baptism for salvation are not biblical in origin and, in the case of the latter, not consistent with the teachings of Vatican 2. These doctrines, he suggests, are incompatible with a Christianity that seeks to interact with other religions in the Asian context. [31]
By distinguishing between the teachings of the Bible and doctrines that developed later in response to particular socio-cultural conditions, Balasuriya triggered a furor within the Catholic church. He was excommunicated in 1997 and declared "no longer a Catholic theologian." The Vatican accused him of denying "the nature of Catholic doctrine and, as a consequence… relativizing of the revealed truths contained in them." [32] Conservative western theologians dismissed his views as immature and irrelevant. On the other hand, Balasuriya garnered widespread support in Asia, and several church officials hinted at discrimination by the church against Asian theologians. [33]
The case of Tissa Balasuriya highlights the ambiguity of Christianity in Asia, and in Sri Lanka in particular. While the institutions of the Christian churches are present throughout the nation, the religion itself has yet to develop a role for itself in the pluralistic national community. And, while some church leaders have attempted to adopt such a role, the progress of Christianity as a religious force in Asia remains limited by its ties to and control by the West.
Conclusion
Christianity has the potential to play an important role in ending the ethnic conflict by virtue of its unique position, with institutions throughout Sri Lanka and ties to both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. Yet, because of Christians’ political concerns and the churches’ failure to develop a theology that would promote such a role, Christians have remained largely silent, failing to take a stand on peace and justice issues. The church, to live up to its potential, must immerse itself into the lives of the people—both Christians and non-Christians—adopting what would amount to an Asian theology of liberation. It must take a responsible view of its position as a minority religion, promoting dialog rather than conversion. Only then would Christianity become, in Wilfred’s words, "a promoter of fellowship and a builder of community." [34]
Such a process is certain to bring Asian theologians into conflict with church authorities in the West. On the other hand, as Balasuriya suggests, the need to dialog with other religions in Sri Lanka may provide an opportunity to Christianity worldwide "for reassessing our own traditional theological assumptions." [35] As painful as that may be, it is also an opportunity for the teachings of the churches to reach a new maturity. The Sri Lankan situation thus encourages Christian churches to evaluate the role they want to play in an increasingly pluralistic world. Taking a stand against the war in Sri Lanka, participating as a partner in building a peaceful society, would serve the Sri Lankan people greatly. Yet adopting such a role would also enhance the ability of Christianity to participate constructively throughout the world.
Notes:
Charles Hoole 16.
Population Statistics of Sri Lanka, Table 10; Ross 101; Preston ¶1.
Firth (personal interview).
Jones ¶11; McGowan 130; Ross 101. Ven. Pannila Ananda (April 8, 1994), of the Buddhist temple at Attanagala, spoke to me about the Portuguese destruction of Buddhist temples. He provided a tour of the ruins of the original Attanagala temple, reportedly built in the 3rd century and destroyed by the Portuguese during the 16th century, one of many in the area so destroyed. The prevalence of Portuguese family names in Sri Lanka is attested to by their prevalence in the articles by Fernando, Malcom (December 12, 1997), Preston, etc.
McGowan 130. Note that "budu" is the word for Buddhism in the Sinhala language.
Ibid. 131-133. "Betel" is a leaf chewed for its qualities as a stimulant; some Sri Lankans describe it as comparable to tobacco.
Ibid. 134-142.
Ibid. 134-142.
Ibid. 157.
Wilson 19-22.
Population Statistics of Sri Lanka, Table 10; Fernando 1; Wilson 53. On the small number of Protestants, McGowan (137) refers to the wholesale abandonment of the Anglican Church by Sinhalese Christians over a poor translation of the bible introduced by a western missionary in the late nineteenth century.
McGowan 134-135; Wilson 54. Sarath Hewagama, Executive Director of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, told me that many of those who converted to Catholicism were from the lowest castes; they adopted Portuguese names to avoid caste identification, because Sinhalese family names identify one’s caste. (Conversation during a tour of a low-caste village July 4, 1994.)
Wilson 54 (quoted); Wilfred 180.
Wilson 184. However, Preston (¶9, 11) notes a campaign in the early 1970s to unite the Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Baptist sects into a United Church of Ceylon. This effort failed after a legal challenge by dissident church members. He quotes Anglican Bishop Kenneth Fernando as being ready to make another attempt.
Wilson 184.
Dissanayaka 286.
Charles Hoole 15; Fernando ¶1-9. I have also heard eyewitness accounts of a certain evangelical sect converting young Buddhist and Hindu children to Christianity, and attempting to convert the parents by turning the children against them. These accounts, it must be acknowledged, involved one particular (but well-known) sect, and appear to be the exception rather than the rule. Nonetheless, such incidents understandably fuel Buddhist resentment against Christian evangelization.
Fernando 9-10 ff; "Assembly of God Church Attacked."
Preston ¶2.
Graemme Muckart, quoted in Preston ¶4.
Rajan Hoole 83. UTHR(J) 1998, 94-96. See also "After the Fall of Jaffna," in which the anonymous Jesuit Refugee Service seems much more tolerant of LTTE human rights violations than those of the Sri Lankan military. The events of the UTHR(J) report include an apparent LTTE attack on a public bus, which the LTTE claimed was bombed by the military, and LTTE party-line criticism of the 1998 provincial council elections. It must be noted here that UTHR(J) was formed from the group that, with Rajan Hoole, wrote The Broken Palmyra. Although the name has changed, I do not wish to imply that there is a second organization making this claim.
Firth (personal interview). Note, however, that Catholics in particular have occasionally become politically active. Malcolm (December 12, 1997) describes an environmental protest against a proposed power plant near Chilaw that drew "more than 10,000 Catholics"—a huge draw in such a small country.
Wilfred 179-180.
Ibid. 179-180.
Ibid. 184.
Charles Hoole 12, 14.
Ibid. 15-16.
Ibid. 13, 15. Hoole argues that this stems from a lack of democratic process, particularly within the Protestant churches.
See Charles Hoole 16; Wilfred 184; Balasuriya 1997, ¶28 ff; Balasuriya 1998, ¶21-23. From the Catholic perspective, these reflect a tradition of Catholic Social Teachings developed in papal encyclicals since 1893. See particularly Octigesima Adveniens 46, 48; Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 47; Medellin 1:2
Charles Hoole 15; Balasuriya 1997, ¶15 ff. Hendon (Spring 97), for example, quotes Balasuriya on the traditional Catholic image of Mary as "Mary of the capitalist, patriarchal, colonialist first world… a dehydrated figure who is not quite human."
Balasuriya 1997, ¶28 ff. He suggests that the Church’s attitude toward other religions in practice is contrary to the respect for other religions expressed in Gaudiem et Spes, which recognizes that God’s revelation may be present in all religions. On the relevance of inter-religious dialog, see Beck, for example, on the Vatican’s recent inflammatory dialog with Buddhism.
Schaeffer, January 17, 1997.
Toolan ¶11; Malcolm (June 20, 1997); Malcom (February 20, 1998); Schaeffer (December 27, 1996), ¶3; Jones ¶43; "Bad Karma" ¶5. Several church officials and commentators noted the unusually harsh penalty imposed (for example, "Balasuriya Case Shows Folly of Rome’s Harsh Tactics"). Others, including Balasuriya himself, argued that the Vatican failed to follow due process in the proceedings as outlined in canon law. The Pope restored Balasuriya to the congregation in 1998 after the latter professed a Declaration of Faith.
Wilfred 179-180, 185.
Balasuriya 1997, ¶37.
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